The Economics of Shooting Down a Drone With Another Drone

Interceptor drones are rapidly becoming the preferred choice for countering the threat posed by cheap one-way attack drones, as militaries seek to bridge the cost gap between disposable attackers and high-end missile interceptors.

The problem is stark: a one-way attack drone like the Shahed costs roughly $40,000 to $80,000, but. If attacking forces flood the sky with dozens of low-cost attackers, the math shifts against missile interceptors. Even if a missile is "cheap",, using them to swat down $2,000 Shaheds is a loss leader.

Interceptor drones have moved from discussion to real-world procurement actions:

• The U.S. Army announced [in February 2024] that it would rapidly acquire 600 Coyote 2C interceptor drones from RTX for $75 million, completing the action in less than 30 days after authorization and funding.
• The U.S. Department of Homeland Security awarded a five-year, $1.5 billion indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity contract to 12 companies for counter-UAS systems.
• France’s Direction Générale de l’Armement issued a tender for the supply of 1,000 counter-UAS interceptor drones, with a reported total value of around EUR 18.7 million.
• The Pentagon signed a $500 million contract with Perennial Autonomy for the development and supply of AI-driven counter-drone systems, based on technology fielded in Ukraine.
• A report on U.S. air-defense spending said the Department of Defense cited a unit cost of roughly $35,000 for the LUCAS drone family.

The art of the military procurement is often in choosing the sweet spot, a handbraked car that doesn't outrun a Ferrari yet gets you home reliably. Is a mid-priced interceptor drone like that place?

Quoted figures suggest it can be: the U.S. Army bought 13,000 Merops interceptor drones during the Iran conflict, at roughly $15,000 per unit. A report on Ukraine said an autonomous interceptor drone reportedly costs around $3,500 per unit., while the Shahed-style UAVs they target cost [between $40,000 and $80,000.

For a dedicated small UAV interceptor, that leaves a cost-per-intercept gap of 15-50X cheaper than even the cheapest Shahed, and 100X cheaper than existing missile options.

The arithmetic can change, but governmental procurement actions suggest that dedicated interceptor drones are currently beating missile-based intercepts on cost. Calculations show a cost-per-intercept figure that's roughly 10-50X cheaper for interceptor drones than the targeted drone, and 100X cheaper than a missile.

A primary factor in that equation is the interceptor's ability to engage under the right conditions. For the U.S. Army's Coyote 2C, that means, designed to intercept at close range and recover the drone for.

The operational constraints for drone-on-drone intercepts are clear: interceptors need to detect at two kilometers, track at least one kilometer, and neutralize at a minimum range of 500 meters, whereas missiles demand a longer engagement envelope, which complicates logistics.

Despite the sourcing of contract values, so-called "cost per intercept" figures remain difficult to pin down, because interceptors are bought in batches that do not transit to an explicit cost per kill. Even when reusability is factored in, a lot of the cost is left out, such as the hit rate or kill chance.

A concrete explanation for the accelerated drone-on-small-drones adoption is also elusive, likely because that explanation amounts to a comparison of relative price points. The concrete anecdote is that [the Merops] could become less expensive than by successful interception or recovery.

One source noted the "enormous cost difference" between shooting down a drone with a missile worth [over $600,000 per interceptor] a Shahed, versus the cost of an autonomous interceptor drone. That sums up the choice:, though the costs wash out when considering batch intercept rates.